

4 April 1952

SUBJECT: IDEOLOGICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

I. The Problem

1. To examine the value, content and our means for waging effective ideological warfare against the worldwide Communist apparatus.

II. Definitions

2. a. Ideology: The basic beliefs motivating a social system.
- b. Ideological warfare: A planned attack against the basic ideology of a hostile system. (Should be conducted concurrently with a vigorous effort to gain acceptance or tolerance of basic ideas of our own system.)

III. Analysis

3. There is general agreement that the ideological aspects of the current conflict are extremely vital and that we have as yet done very little to develop our own capabilities. The Soviets "have been conducting for 30 years a well-planned campaign aimed at inspiring the world to win among our own supporters new converts saping the strength of opposition" [REDACTED]. Thus far we have done little to defend against this ideological invasion or to attack it at its source. "One cannot fight an ideological war without ideological tools. It is ideology which organizes hardness and unites and gives directions about directives."

4. Human activity follows this sequence: emotion, ideas, organization and action. In our struggle against the Soviets we have

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organized and acted without developing a positive synthesis of our own ideas and without developing ideological shells to disrupt the basic concepts of the enemy. Communism everywhere tends to be guided by theory, whereas Americans tend to be extremely pragmatic rather than theoretical in their approaches to problems. It is for this reason, perhaps, that we have overlooked the advantages that can accrue from a well-designed ideological campaign.

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5. The Soviets, in contrast, have made ideology a prime weapon. The basic strategy of Communist ideological warfare, contends [REDACTED] is simple. "They are throwing the book at us. Long ago they adopted the sound principle that ephemeral types of propaganda, such as the radio, pamphlets, newspapers, are ineffective unless they are related to a philosophic frame of reference embodied in a permanent literature. They have recognized that this literature must be in book form, scholarly in tone, that it should refer constantly to philosophy and history. . . . By its very quantity, this permanent literature creates the impression of validity and growing strength. By vigorous promotion, it gains the glamour of inspiration and enthusiasm. A Soviet broadcast may be pegged to the news, but it is intimately related to the basic philosophy developed in the permanent literature of Communism. The fact that our radio broadcasts are forced to reply to this without reference to any universally available literature of our own, only adds to the significance of theirs. It is proof to the world that we are on the ropes."

6. In fighting the cold war we have carefully examined every single possible, available tool for coping with the Soviets. We have

tried agent operations into the Soviet and satellite areas. We experimented tentatively with economic warfare and have done enough in this field so that we know that the technique is quite limited. The broad propaganda offensives addressed to the mass of the Russian people have so far not made the slightest dent in the problem. The reason for these failures is that these techniques of non-military warfare rely on our organizing entirely by ourselves a communications system which will extend into the USSR. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been able to prevent us from doing this. It is now necessary to try to find a technique which will utilize, at least in part, their communications net and their communications systems. The only technique of non-violent warfare that we have not tried is the ideological tool which fortuitously is the very one which does not demand that we organize a communications system. With this technique our material will be picked up by the Soviets themselves, put in their channels and funneled to their collating machinery, which is probably located directly under the Party Central Committee. Their intelligence net far exceeds ours in the number of collectors. But because they do not trust their people they use few intelligence collators and these are located close to the top. Hence the ideological attack will be delivered where it counts.

7. The implications of this analysis can be seen in a comparison of psychological and ideological warfare. Psychological warfare must always concern itself with concrete events and is, therefore, circumscribed by our lack of concrete intelligence and our media. We cannot, for example, promote friction between the factory foreman and one of the workers in

some Russian city unless we know all the internal details of the particular plant operations and have some means of getting our message to the people in the plant. But in the ideological field we can be certain that our message will always reach the heart of the Soviet system. A discussion of Lenin's and Stalin's views on the nationalist question, for example, or of Lenin's concept of the Communist state operating without special apparatus for compulsion, would certainly strike home. In effect, it does not matter what medium we use if we can be certain that they will receive it. The gradual insertion of ideas designed to promote ultimate doubt in the Communist elite as to the validity of their whole system can be accomplished by a gradual process. Since in the ideological offensive we are not trying to reach the masses, we can deal in abstractions. Why have they veered so far from pure Leninism, for example? Such questions could be made very disturbing to the elite and if raised and insisted upon could create profound cleavages.

8. Every society ultimately rests on a moral foundation. If this can be undermined the whole order will tumble. Beck and Godin's book, Russian Purge, vividly portrays the Russian fear that their "faith" in Communism may be faith in a monster. "The loyal or 'convinced' Soviet citizen, as he calls himself, may be dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hurt by it, but losing faith in it would mean losing faith in himself. In his faith lies his salvation. Every Communist must sacrifice his conscience, his natural moral feelings, to the Soviet ideal. What would become of a believer in Moloch who lost his faith in his idol after sacrificing his only beloved son to it?"

9. Can we undermine Communist faith in their religion? According to Truman Smith we can regard "the Cominform as the organized expression

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of the 'Communist religion.' This religious aspect of Communism has been generally recognized by students of Marxist and Leninist theories. The fervor and fanaticism with which its adherents have propagated its doctrines, are strikingly similar to the fervor and fanaticism with which the early followers of Mohammed propagated Islam. History teaches us, however, that religions have an Achilles' Heel. They are one and all subject to schism. Mohammedism suffered severely from the Shiah schism, Roman Catholicism, from the Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican schisms. Communism, too, has shown the same weakness. During the thirty years which have passed since Lenin gained power in Russia, successive heresies have developed within Communism; the Trotskyite, the Zinovief-Radek, and most recently, the Titoist. Though, to date, of these heresies only the Titoist has made its effect in a power sense, there is no reason seen why it should be the last of Communist heresies. Already we are hearing rumblings of a Nosaka heresy in Japan which, indeed, may be but a double echo of a Mao schism with the Cominform."

10. Our task is to deepen these ideological rifts within Communism, to strengthen the heretical forces. The problem of attacking ideologically Communism at its worldwide ideological voice, the Cominform, must be treated differently within and outside the Soviet orbit. The difference is between "contained" areas (the Soviet Empire) and the "free" areas. In the contained or closed areas, the masses are pinned down and our job is to unchain them. In the free areas, where the masses are on the move for reforms, good or bad, the Kremlin seeks to use them as dynamite against us; our job is to channel their motions in the right direction away and against Bolshevism.

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11. If we succeed in unchaining the masses of the Soviet Empire, the "chain" reaction will be definitive and unanswerable. History will pronounce a death sentence. On the other hand, "Bolshevism's" ideological and organizational infiltration into the free or "open" world to the extent that it weakens, neutralizes or paralyzes our efforts against the "chained" world, throws the whole effort out of gear.

12. Our enemy's strength is based on organized ideological warfare. The lure (idealism) he holds forth is the abolition of all "evils" past and present and the economic salvation of the "have-nots" and hence the salvation of humanity as a whole. It is by "ideology" based on material interest that the masses are hooked onto his chariot and eventually led to disaster.

13. "Illusions are the children of our dreams" and civilizations, from time immemorial have built on great illusions, but never illusions based on materialism. Rather they were based on the inner urges which constitute the ennobling elements of man and make civilizations possible. Bolshevik ideology is inferior, and a successful attack against it can soften up, disintegrate Bolshevik organization -- the keystone of the whole enemy structure.

14. The ideological factor is the Achilles Heel of Bolshevism, a machine put together to impose an ideological pattern that has been demonstrably proven to be inferior. Communism is vulnerable to a counter ideological attack, because whatever moral sanction there is behind the "elite" of Bolshevism, is based on ideology. The more we puncture that ideology and reduce it to cinders in the minds of men, the easier the rest of the job we have set ourselves to do. If we do an effective

ideological disintegration job, much that now looks forbidding may become easy.

IV. Possible Content of Ideological Warfare

15. Our basic aim is to neutralize and paralyze the effectiveness of Soviet ideology without at the same time doing harm to our own. We should not release ideological forces that might in the long run be destructive of our basic spiritual and social concepts. This guiding principle implies that we should have several ideological campaigns in process simultaneously with a varied treatment given to each major offensive.

16. Against the Stalinists our ideological warfare should be entirely negative in aim, although not in character. We should blast the essential weaknesses of their ideology; i.e. those aspects which are in contradiction to the very deepest human desires and aspirations as demonstrated by their historical validity. Two chief forces that Soviet ideology has attempted to muzzle are (a) a belief in some sort of a Divine Being and hence a purposeful moral universe beyond the material (the Soviets' system actually has a moral imperative, but it is based on a material rather than a non-material foundation), and (b) the Soviets have tried to throttle the basic and instinctive desire of human beings to own property. It is this instinct which Lenin suggested the Communists had to "beat to death."

17. John N. Hazard makes these two pertinent points about this aspect of Communist ideology:

a. The first, and most important, is that production can be maintained at an adequate rate only if planned. Capitalism

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is wasteful because of the duplication of effort. This tenet did not originate with Marx or Engels but came into being in the 1920's along with their economic plan for reconstruction.

b. The second basic tenet is that planning is impossible if property is privately owned. Only after production is adequate can there be any extension of individual freedom.

18. These so-called necessities of Communist ideology run counter to the beliefs, sentiments and urges of the Russian people. These, in turn, are the accumulated product of generations, if not centuries, and it takes equally long to modify and uproot them. The basic craving and 'belief' of the peasant to have his own land and work it in behalf of himself and his family cannot be shaken by 'decrees' or agitators, no matter how 'clever' they may be. Nor can his 'belief' in certain simple spiritual values which have been with him from the dim past and which he associates with his other beliefs. To shake these beliefs even a little, the Bolsheviks would have to come forward with something demonstrably superior. Mere words, no matter how "intellectual" could never do it. The same thing in different degrees holds good even for Communists whose subconscious urges are in line with those of the masses, and hence potential deserters from Stalin's rune. Following their instinctive and ingrained "belief" the Russians want to "call their lives their own" and not the State's. The Russians, of course, also want the tools that go with it, which we call "rights" — property, etc. That does not mean that they want the old factory or land owners back. Not at all, and we would make a capital mistake to in anyway

associate our ideological attack with such notions. On the contrary, these ghosts of the past must be laid to rest. Death, attrition and Communism have cleared the tables for us. Hence the forces of today that must be encouraged, individually and collectively, to own and possess what has been created.

19. What have we in mounting an ideological counter-warfare to offer to the peoples of Russia? To the peasants, and most of Stalin's armies are peasants, it is "land and freedom." To the populations of the cities, who make up the leadership of those armies and the workers, managers, etc., we offer "ownership" of the enterprises and freedom. To the individual, every individual, we offer the freedom and security which have been part of us since time immemorial. In short, against the fake Communist concept of "ownership by the people" we offer real ownership and all that this entails.

20. Ideological Justification for Titoism

a. The purpose of this struggle is to win Communists who belong to the Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin branch of Marxism from Stalin. The Communist ideology has three basic branches, two of which have a substantial theoretical justification. One is Lenin-Stalinism, which contends that a historical spread of Communism throughout the world is inevitable, but that the spread depends upon the effective development of the USSR as a base for expansion. Trotskyism asserts that a worldwide revolutionary condition is an essential prerequisite for the complete enthronement of Communism. The Trotskyites contend that real Communism is not possible unless

this world revolution takes place.

b. The Titoists, on the other hand, contend — or should contend — that Communism within a given country is possible without either a worldwide revolution or subservience of that country to Moscow. Theoretically, justification for this should have two aims: (1) the encouragement of independence on the part of the satellite and Chinese Communists from Moscow; and (2) the severance of the Communist Parties in Western Europe and other regions from Moscow. There are Yugoslav developments such as experiments with a quasi-free price structure that lend themselves to ideological justification.

21. The third major target is the European Marxists who believe that Socialism is attainable through legal methods. This crowd is hostile toward any system of cooperative, free enterprise. In the long run the victory for this concept in Western Europe might be detrimental to the United States. Therefore, the task in this area is to show the growing social nature of regulated free enterprise, demonstrating simultaneously the need for rigid Marxist Socialism to accept a greater degree of privately sponsored productivity.

22. A fourth area of concern is the Middle East and Southeastern Asia, which at the present time is neither Marxist nor capitalist, although the Marxists apparently have their foot in the door more than we do. For this area we should develop an ideology based on a variation of a communal, cooperative society in which private enterprise, from the very moment of its development, has cooperative ownership and is designed less for maximum profit than it is for maximum service.

23. Finally, there should be a new ideology for conscious, regulated free enterprise; i.e., the American System, 1952. We are still having to suffer for the sins of 1850 Capitalism in England, when in reality our system bears little or no resemblance to the laissez-faire capitalism condemned by Marx.

24. These various ideological weapons should be produced in complete synthesis so that they could be put side by side and that the net result of all of them taken together would be to strengthen our society, the American position throughout the world, and weaken that of the Soviets. As a possible means of satisfying this content, attention is directed to Tab A.

V. Action Indicated

25. A competent individual should be given the task of blocking out in some detail the various psychological tools we should acquire and survey the field for individuals competent to shape these tools. This done, and his ideological program approved, he should be given the task of getting the actual book or books written. At a minimum this job will take at least six months and should be undertaken perhaps as a headquarters project. For details see Tab B.

26. Simultaneously, the PY Division should begin to organize a Communist center charged with detailed surveillance of the entire Communist movement on a worldwide basis, paying special attention to weaknesses in the Soviet ideological armor reflected in organizational changes and shifts. Simultaneously, the PY Division should analyze the media most appropriate to ideological warfare, paying particular attention

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to the suggestions of [REDACTED] on the value of hard books in an ideological battle. For details see Tab C.

VI. Recommendations

27. It is recommended that (a) a competent individual be designated to develop a program for ideological warfare for presentation to the Survey Group by 15 May 1952; (b) that PY organize a Communist Center by 15 May 1952.

TAB A

FIVE IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS

The following books should be developed as our principle ideological tools:

1. To form a hard core, a firm, well-defined ideology is required which must be Messianic and scientific at the same time — not purely nationalistic. It is a world-embracing ideology we are fighting and not a regional phenomenon. To solve this problem, a book 500-800 pages, revalidating theoretically the major principles of free society, must be produced. It must be a book of substance, addressed to the thinking elements — not to the masses — and while upholding the principles upon which our society is based, be critical of its faults.
2. Another book based on the broad premises of the first one, should address itself to the problems of the Russian System, specifically analyze the inferiority of the system as compared with one based on freedom of the individual. The inevitability of its failure and the necessity of its overthrow before millions more perish and life is reduced to more and more slavery, torment and hunger.
3. Book No. 3 should address itself to the Problems of Asia, which are distinct and call for separate treatment — book No. 3 being based on books 1 and 2.
4. Book No. 4 should address itself to the Problems of the Near and Middle East.
5. Book No. 5 should address itself to the Problems of Europe.

TAB B

DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL WEAPONS

1. The following considerations should be taken into account in the development of ideological weapons:
 - a. Block out the areas in which an ideological tool is required either against a hostile ideology or to give support of a neutral ideology.
 - b. Ascertain people competent to develop these ideological tools.
 - c. Create project for development of these tools.
 - d. Develop plan for exploitation of these tools.
2. We should avoid direct dealing with people selected to develop our ideology.
3. We should ascertain the views of people tentatively selected through cut-outs. If it becomes obvious that a given individual's contribution can be fitted into our plans, we should negotiate for what we want through cut-outs.
4. We should give adequate financial backing to the development of these tools and to their worldwide propagation.

TAB C

COMMUNIST CENTER

I. Purpose

To maintain a constant surveillance on worldwide Communism for the purpose of detecting and developing opportunities for ideological, political, and psychological attack against it. This purpose would not conflict with, but would reinforce the mission of the USSR Division (to assist in the penetrations of non-orbit Communist parties and to launch penetration operations against the USSR).

II. Concept

Although Russian territory is difficult to penetrate, the worldwide apparatus of Communism is open to attack; over half the area in which the Cominform operates lacks the protection of the MVD. Because of the direct connection between the branches of the Cominform within and outside of the Soviet orbit, attack on one part is also an attack on the other. The Cominform is the organized expression of Communist ideology. Since both ideology and power struggles play an important role in the motivation behind Soviet actions, any attack against the Communist worldwide apparatus must of necessity concern itself with ideological-power questions. Ideological-power factors are of direct operational interest for these basic reasons:

- A. Power struggles within the Soviet bloc and within the worldwide Communist parties are conducted around and within the framework of ideological issues.

- B. Conflicts

B. Conflicts which take place within the Communist bloc and within the Cominform apparatus outside of the Soviet bloc are usually reflections of incipient conflicts within the Soviet Union and the Politburo itself.

C. Power struggles are vital because their outcome for the loser is final. Once a Communist attains a high level of influence he either holds his own or gains, or else he is eliminated. The element of personal insecurity this brings to key officials is incalculable.

D. Ideological divisions could either be manufactured or intensified through information obtained by a competent professional surveillance of the worldwide Communist apparatus.

III. Types of Conflict Within the Worldwide Communist System

Within the Communist system there are constant policy disputes over organization, control, and power distribution. There^{re} is, consequently, a shifting and precarious balance of power maintained between the various groups backing conflicting policies. In these conflicts personal loyalties and dislikes play important roles, but the actual issues are normally couched in ideological terms. Alternate choices for action, even when fundamentals are agreed upon, may be supported by one group or another as a matter of life and death. There are always those policy issues in a given situation on which some want to go slow^{v,} opposing those who advocate a tight organization versus a loose organization, who advocate an aggressive policy versus a soft policy.

IV. Indices to Watch

The following are some indices which the Communist Center should watch in order to detect nascent power struggles and ideological cleavages within the Soviet system.

a. Movement of important personnel — trouble shooters, policy makers, hatchet men — these movements might indicate incipient defection, a hardening of the line, shift in policy, etc.

b. Source of guidance of Communist Party outside the Soviet orbit. Does a given party receive instructions from Moscow, Peiping, Warsaw, etc.? This question might be answered by source of propaganda and might indicate shifts in power between one element or another.

c. Locations of schools, training centers, locale of conferences, subject of conferences, etc.

d. Organizational changes in functional design in particular countries, shifts in personalities.

e. Finances: Where does the money come from? Does a given party seem to be flush or poverty-stricken? Hard or soft policy in a particular country's Communist Party? Correlation with overt Soviet policy announcements — variation with?

f. Front organizations: Developments — change in line, new creations, variety, growth or decline, correlation between official Soviet line and front line.

g. Meaning of internal Soviet or satellite developments: Rate of collectivization, rate of industrialization, etc.

h. Travel restrictions both into and outside of the Communist orbit, closed territories, control of means of communication^{cations}; propaganda

analysis of major agit prop publications.

i. Changes in or insistence upon protocol between Soviets and others.

j. Ideological discussions, alterations in Stalinism, returns to Marxism or Leninism. Admitted discrepancies between theory and practice. Inconsistencies in Party line.

V. Use of Center

This type of surveillance would isolate trends and expose weaknesses in worldwide Soviet apparatus. These findings should be made available to appropriate staff or division elements for their exploitation either in the form of psychological, political, or ideological attack, counter-front development (IO) or for penetration (USSR).

VI. Relation with Area Divisions

a. Each line division would have an individual assigned to monitor the activities of each large or important Communist Party in its area.

b. The Communist Center would help train these individuals and assist them in exploiting weaknesses in area Communist Parties.

c. The Communist Center would monitor and coordinate the general surveillance of Communist Party activities.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

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			DATE 1952		
			DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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[REDACTED]			14 April	MB	
			24 April	MB	
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8. BTR (file)				CLF	
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